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Evolving Societal Norms and the Fourth Amendment: Government 
Tracking of Cellphone Locations in an Era of Commercial Tracking 
 
By Paul Tahan* 
 
The precise locations of 200 million smartphones in the United States were 
commercially tracked in 2017.1 As many as seventy-five companies 
collected the location of these smartphones.2 In some instances, businesses 
gathered the precise location, accurate to within a few yards, of individual 
smartphones as often as 14,000 times per day.3 Some used the information 
to personalize ads.4 Others sent this hyper-localized private information 
unsolicited to partner businesses, some of whom did not want to receive it.5 
Although the location data was anonymized, in many instances it was 
specific enough for individual identities to be discerned.6 For example, one 
set of data reviewed by the New York Times followed a smartphone 
arriving at the site of a homicide before going to a nearby hospital.7 The 
phone returned throughout the night to the local police station.8 Another 
set of data, associated with a teacher named Lisa, was specific enough for 
journalists to determine Lisa’s full name and interview her for the article.9 
 
The ease with which companies can obtain precise smartphone location 
data raises compelling questions about the reasonableness of a person’s 
expectation of privacy in their location. This is an important issue because 
the Government may subpoena a smartphone’s historical GPS information 
from a third party such as an advertiser without a warrant if a person no 
longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in such.10 Thus we come to 
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the critical question: at what point is a smartphone’s GPS location so public 
as to render tracking of it by the Government reasonable and not violative 
of the Fourth Amendment? 
 
The reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment is closely tied 
to the existence, or lack thereof, of an expectation of privacy to the area 
sought to be searched “that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”11 A person travelling in an automobile on public roads, for 
example, has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements 
because, by so doing, they voluntarily convey that they are traveling over 
particular roads in a particular direction.12 Combined with strong 
jurisprudence critical of an individual’s expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily turned over to third parties,13 the Court may 
conclude that a person no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their GPS-enabled smartphone’s historical location data. 
 
For the moment, the Supreme Court has disposed of a similar issue. In 
Carpenter v. United States the Court found that, given the unique nature of 
cellphone location records, “the fact that the information is held by a third 
party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment 
protection.”14 While this is reassuring to those of us attached to our 
smartphones, your author is not convinced that it is impenetrable 
jurisprudence. The Carpenter dissent posited that “[c]ell-site records… are 
no different from the many kinds of business records the Government has 
a lawful right to obtain by compulsory process.”15 In an era where Apple’s 
Find My Friends allows users to permit friends to track the location of their 
smartphone, and where seventy-five companies have access to the location 
information of 200 million smartphones, location information is arguably 
 
11 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
12 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983). Knotts involved law enforcement’s 
use of an electronic “beeper” tracking device. Id. at 285. The Court found that the use of 
such did not invade the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus did not 
constitute a search. Id. 
13 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (no expectation of privacy in 
dialed phone numbers because the information is voluntarily conveyed to the phone 
company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (no expectation of privacy in 
bank records). 
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more public than other business records, such as bank records, that the 
Government may obtain by subpoena. 
 
There is additional cause for concern: Carpenter specifically protected “cell-
site location information” (“CSLI”) which is different from GPS 
information.16 CSLI is available to the individual’s carrier whether the 
consumer likes it or not; it is a record of each cell tower the phone connects 
to.17 GPS tracking, conversely, is “opted into.” On an iPhone, for example, 
users can turn off GPS entirely or limit which apps can see their location.18 
This is an important difference from Carpenter: the Court emphasized CSLI 
is not “shared” as one normally understands the term because (1) carrying 
a cellphone is indispensable to participation in modern society and (2) a 
cellphone logs CSLI without any affirmative act on the part of the user 
beyond powering it up.19 GPS data, on the other hand, is (1) not necessarily 
indispensable to participation in modern society and (2) requires the user 
to affirmatively opt-in. Part (2) also distinguishes smartphone GPS 
information from traditional GPS trackers placed by law enforcement: not 
only is the user aware they are being tracked, but they consent to their 
smartphone’s ability to do so.20 
 
The Carpenter Court, as it tends to do in contentious cases, stressed that its 
holding was “a narrow one.”21 To be extremely precise, the Court held that 
“accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”22 
The Court expressly declined to consider “whether there is a limited period 
 
16 Id. at 2217. 
17 Id. at 2211. 
18 Turn Location Services and GPS on or off on your iPhone, iPad, or iPod touch, Apple Inc. 
(Sept. 20, 2017), https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT207092. 
19 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
20 The Supreme Court has traditionally required a warrant for law enforcement to install 
GPS tracking devices. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). In Jones the 
Supreme Court found that warrantless installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, 
and use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constituted a “search.” Id. at 
404. The Court emphasized, however, that its holding was based upon the physical 
intrusion that accompanied placing of the monitor. Id. at 404–05. In contrast, tracking of 
an individual’s cellphone via GPS or reviewing historical location records requires no 
physical intrusion and cannot be accomplished unless the individual has consented to 
outside companies tracking their location. 
21 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
22 Id. at 2217 n.3. 
 




for which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI free 
from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”23 In addition, although the Court 
emphasized that CSLI is collected without consumer consent,24 it did not 
address treatment of similar information that is collected with consumer 
consent, such as historical GPS location information. In fact, the Court 
expressly declined to address the issue, stating its opinion did not “address 
other business records that might incidentally reveal location 
information.”25 
 
There is a ray of hope for the privacy-conscious among us: the Carpenter 
majority emphasized the invasiveness of cellphone tracking, the intimacy 
of the information it reveals, and the ease and low cost compared to 
traditional investigative tools,26 concerns that would certainly apply to GPS 
information. The Court also implied that the greater locational accuracy 
enabled by GPS tracking of an individual’s movements might be even more 
invasive.27 Combined with recognition of a person’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the whole of their physical movements tracked by information 
held by a third party,28 a cellphone’s historical GPS data seems to be 
protected from warrantless search. For now. 
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25 Id. 
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27 See id. at 2218 (stating that it did not matter that CSLI was less precise than GPS 
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28 Id. at 2219. 
